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Abstract
Mixed virus infections in plants are common in nature and their interactions affecting host plants would depend mainly on
plant species, virus strains, the order of infection and initial amount of inoculum. Hence, the prediction of outcome of virus
competition in plants is not easy. In this study, we applied evolutionary game theory to model the interactions between
Hibiscus latent Singapore virus (HLSV) and Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) in Nicotiana benthamiana under co-infection in
a plant host. The accumulation of viral RNA was quantified using qPCR at 1, 2 and 8 days post infection (dpi), and two
different methods were employed to predict the dominating virus. TMV was predicted to dominate the game in the long
run and this prediction was confirmed by both qRT-PCR at 8 dpi and the death of co-infected plants after 15 dpi. In
addition, we validated our model by using data reported in the literature. Ten out of fourteen reported co-infection
outcomes agreed with our predictions. Explanations were given for the four interactions that did not agree with our model.
Hence, it serves as a valuable tool in making long term predictions using short term data obtained in virus co-infections.
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Introduction
Viral infections are common in plants and it is not unusual
for more than one virus species to infect the same host. These
mixed infections usually generate effects that are not observed
in single infections as plants are often found to be co-infected
with multiple viruses [1]. The synergy ranges from mutual
increase in virus titre, asymmetric increase in titre of one virus,
while no change for another virus [2–3], to no change for one
virus but asymmetric decrease in titre of the other virus [4].
There have been cases of mutual interference, which causes
a decrease in both viruses [5]. Various strategies such as
genetically modifying crops for virus resistance have been
explored to minimize losses from infections caused by viruses
such as Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV). With the current
uncertainty on genetically modified plants as a solution against
viral infections [6–7], exploring the usage of co-infecting viruses
to cross-protect as an alternative solution to counter virulent
plant viruses seems to be a viable alternative. Cross protection
describes the phenomenon which an infection of a mild strain
virus protects plants against subsequent infection from the
severe strain of a closely related virus [8]. When two unknown
viruses interact in the same host, the outcome of the interaction
is often unpredictable. Thus, there is a need to conduct co-
infection experiments to identify the dominant virus.
TMV is a tobamovirus with a broad host range [9]. It causes
necrosis in Nicotiana benthamiana Domin which leads to plant death.
Hibiscus latent Singapore virus (HLSV) is a new member of
Tobamovirus and unlike TMV, it does not cause necrosis in its host.
Instead, it induces mild symptoms such as slight crinkling of leaves
in N. benthamiana [10]. It has been observed that in super-
inoculation experiments, N. benthamiana can be cross-protected
against TMV by HLSV (unpublished data). However, co-
inoculation of both viruses onto the same plant has not been
carried out. Here we applied evolutionary game theory to examine
the interactions between these two viruses in co-infection.
Evolutionary game theory was formulated to analyze a popula-
tion of interacting players, whose fitness are frequency dependent
[11]. It is a two-player, non-zero sum, non-cooperative game with
finite number of strategies and symmetric pay-offs [12]. Unlike
a standard non-cooperative game in which each player knows all
the details of the game and plays rationally, evolutionary game
theory describes a game in which players are ‘pre-programmed’ to
some strategies. In other words, the strategies employed by players
are genetically determined [13]. Prior to replication, an individual
virus randomly encounters another virus, thus engaging each other
in an interaction. This interaction results in a pay-off, which is the
change in fitness in the said individual. The expected number
of surviving progenies is thus proportional to the individual’s
fitness. The motivation behind modelling the two populations’
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interaction outcome using short term data. In other words, it is the
period before symptoms of virus infection appear. Conversely, the
words ‘long term’ is defined here as the time needed to observe the
symptoms of virus infection and to identify the dominating virus,
either qualitatively or quantitatively. Hence the period of ‘long
term’ is relative and it will depend on the particular combinations
of host plants and viruses. ‘Short term’ refers to the minimum time
needed to predict the interaction outcome that agrees with the
long term data.
In a game involving two players and two strategies, a pay-off
matrix is used to model their interactions (Table 1).
Each player has a different fitness depending on which other
individual it has interacted (played) with. Player A has a fitness of
a if playing against Player A, a fitness of b against Player B. On the
other hand, Player B has a fitness of c against Player A and a fitness
of d against Player B. Under the assumption of a well-mixed
population where players encounter each other randomly, there
are four outcomes which depend on the relative fitness between
the two players resulting from their interactions. Player A
dominates the game if a.c and b.d. Similarly, player B dominates
the game if a,c and b,d. In any mixed population, it will
converge towards a homogenous population containing the
dominant player. The fitness of the dominant player is a result
of the interactions between both players and it is relatively higher
than the opponent. However, when there is no clear dominance,
i.e. when a.c and b,d, player A plays better against player A, but
not against player B and vice versa. Both strategies are in strict
Nash equilibrium [14], the well-mixed population will converge to
either one of the players, depending on which strategy becomes
established first [12]. When a,c and b.d, both strategies are
equally competitive. The well mixed population will remain
heterogeneous as it is more advantageous for both players to
interact with opponents, as compared to a homogenous popula-
tion.
In the context of a co-infection, the viruses are both the players
and the strategies. By virtue of being a virus itself is a strategy
because each species of viruses possesses a set of behaviours such as
replication, expression of coat protein, virion assembly, virus
movement, etc, which differentiates it from other virus species/
players. Application of game theory to the interactions between
plant viruses during mixed infection has yielded interesting insights
into the synergism between different species of viruses [15]; but the
model needs to be generalized in order to have a broader range of
applications. We achieve this by identifying the evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) in their interactions. ESS is a strategy which
cannot be dominated by any other alternative strategies in a game,
leading to equilibrium in a game. By identifying the ESS in
a particular interaction between two viruses, we are able to predict
the long term outcome of viral interactions using short term data.
In this study, we investigated the virus accumulation in N.
benthamiana plants infected with HLSV and/or TMV under co-
infection. The collected short term data was then used to model
their interactions and to predict their long term interaction
outcome.
Results and Discussion
Changes of Virus Accumulation in Single and Mixed
Infections
To compare the fitness of the two viruses under single and
mixed infections, we computed the relative virus accumulation. It
was computed as the ratio of the amount of viral RNA
accumulated in each infection compared with the values obtained
for HLSV in single infections. The relative means 6 SEM of viral
RNA accumulation for each virus at 1 and 2 dpi, respectively,
with single and mixed infections, were compared (Fig. 1), using the
1 dpi viral accumulation of HLSV as the baseline. At 1 dpi,
HLSV RNA accumulated at 1.00060.113, while TMV RNA
accumulated at 0.96760.354 (Mann-Whitney test, P=0.115). In
mixed infections, HLSV accumulation decreased to 0.62960.162,
a 47.1% decrease (Mann-Whitney test, P=0.045), while TMV
decreased to 0.73060.335, a 24.5% decrease (Mann-Whitney test,
P=0.05), suggesting a competition between the two viruses.
At 2 dpi, HLSV accumulated at 0.98360.237, a 1.7% decrease
but the decrease was not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney
test, P=0.64). HLSV takes time to replicate and as such the
difference in viral RNA accumulation between 1 and 2 dpi was
relatively small. On the other hand, TMV increased by 241% to
3.29960.176 (Mann-Whitney test, P=0.017). In mixed infections,
HLSV accumulation in 2 dpi decreased to 0.14660.045, an
85.1% decrease (Mann-Whitney test, P,0.002). Similarly, TMV
level in mixed infections experienced a 1.85% decrease, to
3.23860.664 (Mann-Whitney, P=0.79). The presence of HLSV
lowers the relative amount of TMV, as observed on the first day.
Prediction of Long Term Outcomes Using Short Term
Data
The relative accumulation of the two viruses allows us to
examine their relative fitness. We have constructed the pay-off
matrix by arranging the relative accumulation of virus in single
and mixed infections for both days (Table 2).
TMV had a higher fitness when competing against its own
population (d=0.96760.354.c=0.73060.335) but a lower fit-
ness when competing against HLSV
(a=1.00060.113.b=0.62960.162). Modelling with one of the
four scenarios described above, the two viruses were in Nash
equilibrium; both viruses had equally competitive strategies and
were able to overcome each other, depending on which strategy
was established first. One of the prediction methods is to calculate
the expected pay-off values, or fitness of each player [12]. In a well
mixed population with equal amount of HLSV and TMV, the
expected pay-off of HLSV is
1= 2|(1:000)z1= 2|(0:629)+1= 2|
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0:1132z0:1622
p
~0:8145+0:1975
Similarly, the expected pay-off for TMV is calculated to be
0.848560.2437. As the pay-off of TMV slightly exceeded that of
HLSV, it could be speculated that TMV began to dominate the
game at 1 dpi with a small selection advantage and it was highly
likely that TMV would dominate the game in the long run.
An alternative way of making predictions is by finding ESS.
Both viruses would reach a strict Nash equilibrium if ESS was
played. At 1 dpi, the ESS was a mixed strategy; it was
Table 1. The pay-off matrix for the interactions between
a Player and an Opponent.
Player Opponent
AB
Aa b
Bc d
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037007.t001
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Figure 2a is constructed to show the ESS estimation [12], in which
the fitness of each virus under both single and mixed infections are
connected by the two lines. From Figure 2a, the two y-axes
correspond to the type of viruses present in the interaction. TMV
was assigned on the left and HLSV on the right. Taking HLSV as
a focal point, when the x-value (proportion of HLSV) is zero, it
means the competitor is purely TMV, i.e. proportion of HLSV as
a competitor is zero. Hence, TMV would have a relative fitness of
0.967 while HLSV has a relative fitness of 0.629. When the x-
value is 1, it means the second player in the interaction is purely
HLSV. As such, HLSV would have the baseline value of 1 while
TMV has a relative fitness of 0.73.
The x-value (0.556) of the intersection between two lines
represents the proportion of HLSV in an ESS. It is estimated that
in a population consisting of 55.6% HLSV and 44.4% TMV, both
viruses will have the same fitness value. However, such condition is
difficult to achieve in actual experiments, because viruses cannot
be perfectly mixed in a biological system. Also, any fluctuations of
initial virus amount could lead to oscillations and chaotic
behaviours [16]. As the initial percentage of TMV in the
population is 50% which is greater than its proportion in ESS
(44.4%), it can be predicted that TMV would break the
equilibrium and dominate the game. Thus, determination of
ESS provides us with an alternate tool to predict long term
outcomes using short term data.
The 2 dpi data was used to confirm the predictions made based
on 1 dpi data. At 2 dpi, the pay-off values differed significantly
(Table 2). TMV always showed higher fitness when competing
against its own population (d=3.29960.176.c=3.23860.664) or
against HLSV (c=3.23860.664. a=0.98360.237). The ex-
pected pay-off for TMV was calculated to be 3.313560.3435,
being significantly higher than that of HLSV (0.564560.1206).
Using Straffin chart as an alternative method (Figure 2b), the line
connecting fitness of TMV is above that of HLSV and they do not
intersect within the range of [0,1]; hence TMV itself became the
ESS. It can be predicted that TMV would dominate the game in
the long run and the TMV population could no longer be invaded
by HLSV, which is consistent with the prediction made from data
obtained at 1 dpi.
The predictions made using either 1 or 2 dpi data were
consistent with the long term interaction outcome, namely all the
co-infected plants died after 15 dpi due to systemic invasion of
TMV. Also, the qRT-PCR data collected at 8 dpi revealed that
the viral accumulation of TMV was more than a 100 times higher
than that of HLSV in mixed infection (data not shown). Hence,
these two methods proved to be useful in making long term
predictions using short term data.
Validation of Model
To investigate the validity of our proposed model, we conducted
a literature search of scientific papers published on plant virus co-
Figure 1. Relative RNA amount of HLSV and TMV 1 dpi and 2 dpi. The amount of viral RNA was calculated through quantitative PCR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037007.g001
Table 2. The pay-off matrix for 1 dpi and 2 dpi between
HLSV and TMV.
Opponent
1 dpi HLSV TMV
HLSV 1.00060.113 0.62960.162
TMV 0.73060.335 0.96760.354
2 dpi
HLSV 0.98360.237 0.14660.045
TMV 3.23860.664 3.29960.176
The table is constructed using values from qRT-PCR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037007.t002
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a single host plant. A total of 14 virus-virus interactions out of 9
papers that contained data on the short term and long term
quantifications of the viruses were investigated [2,15,17–23]. The
earliest data reported in those papers was taken as short term data,
while the latest data as long term data. The short term data was
subjected to our model and the predicted dominance and the
reported dominance of the viruses in co-infections were compared
for validation (Table 3). The corresponding Straffin charts which
depict the extracted data from the above 14 interactions are
presented in supplementary materials (Figures S1, S2, S3, S4, S5,
S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12, S13, and S14).
Evolutionary game theory has been used to study the
interactions between two different groups of viruses [15], our
model generalizes its application to either genetically closely
related or unrelated viruses. Our proposed model was able to
predict the long term results of the virus co-infections using short
term data in 10 interactions out of the 14 co-infections. The 4
interactions that did not fit our model were Zucchini yellow
mosaic virus (ZYMV-SD) and Cucumber mosaic virus (CMV-Fny)
in cucumber [2], Tomato chlorosis virus (ToCV) and Tomato
infectious chlorosis virus (TiCV) in N. benthamiana [21], Wheat
streak mosaic virus (WSMV) and Triticum mosaic virus (TriMV)
in wheat cultivars Tomahawk and Arapahoe [23]. We predicted
that ZYMV-SD would dominate in cucumber plants, but CMV-
Fny was reported to dominate instead. We had difficulty extracting
data from the paper as the baseline for single virus level is zero.
Furthermore, it was probable that 7 dpi was not long enough to be
indicative of the final interaction outcome for them. As for the
interaction outcome between ToCV and TiCV in N. benthamiana,
we were unable to determine the upper line in the Straffin chart
because of the relatively large error bars (Figure S8). In the co-
infection of WSMV and TriMV in two different cultivars of wheat,
both wheat cultivars possess temperature-dependent resistance
against WSMV but not TriMV [24]. Since our model assumed no
effect from host plants on virus competition, host resistance
allowed TriMV to gain an unfair advantage over WSMV in the
long term. Thus, it explains the observed discrepancy between the
predicted and reported data.
In this experiment, we assume that the players in the game do
not switch their strategies to gain an advantage over their
opponents. However, there are cases where a player ‘‘switches’’
Figure 2. Graphical representations of an alternate method to determine the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The graph was
constructed using data obtained from 1 dpi (a) and 2 dpi (b). The horizontal axis represents the proportion of HLSV in the population. The left vertical
axis shows the relative fitness of TMV and HLSV when no HLSV was present in the population. The right vertical axis shows the relative fitness of TMV
and HLSV when all the other competitors were HLSV. The lines connect the fitness of either viruses under both single- and mixed-infections, and the
x-value of their intersection represents the proportion of HLSV in the ESS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037007.g002
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dominate the game, e.g. escape from a Prisoner’s Dilemma
through clonal selection of fitter progenies [25] and production of
more RNA under stress [26]. Thus, an alternative interpretation
on the results is that TMV has essentially ‘defected’, opting to
cheat and play an unfair game against HLSV by disrupting the
ESS. Further in vitro evolution studies of viruses may shed light into
the mechanism of this ‘defection’ under co-infections.
Materials and Methods
Measurement of Infectious Units
The concentrations of purified HLSV and TMV virons were
measured spectrophotometrically using a Nanodrop spectropho-
tometer (Nanodrop Technologies) in triplicates, after which serial
dilutions were performed (10
22,1 0
23 and 10
24 mg/ml). Chenopo-
dium amaranticolor plants at 12-leaf stage were inoculated with the
diluted HLSV or TMV (in 10 ml) in a Latin square design,
followed by 8 h post-inoculation of dark treatment. Plants were
grown under 16 h light and 8 h dark at 23uC. The number of local
lesions on each inoculated leaves was counted at 6 dpi as an
indication of the number of virus infectious unit. Ten ng each of
HLSV and TMV provide comparable amount of viral infectious
units.
Virus Inoculation and Sample Collection
Ten ng of HLSV or TMV were inoculated on each chosen leaf
of N. benthamiana plants at 6–8 leaf stage to establish single
infections. For mixed infections, chosen leaves were inoculated
with 10 ng each of both viruses in 10 ml inoculation buffer
(50 mM KH2PO4, pH 7.0). Both single and mixed infections were
carried out on two new fully expanded leaves per plant. A mock
control group at 6–8 leaf stage was treated with the same amount
of inoculation buffer. A total of 23 plants were used for each
HLSV, TMV, mixed and mock inoculations. The plants were kept
at 16 h light and 8 h dark at 23uC until sample collection at 1, 2
and 8 dpi. Half of the infected leaf was cut and stored at 280uC
for total RNA extraction. The remaining half of the leaf was left on
the plant for observation of symptom expression in order to
confirm the infection.
RNA Extraction and RT–PCR
Total RNAs were extracted from collected N. benthamiana leaves
as described [27]. The concentration of each RNA sample was
measured using Nanodrop2000 (Thermo Scientific) and first-
strand cDNA synthesis was performed by using SuperScript
TM III
Reverse Transcriptase kit (Invitrogen) with 3 mg of total RNA in
each reaction system, following manufacturer’s instructions. For
single infection, each reaction contained 1 pmol of TMV (59-
AGAGGTCCAAACCAAACCAG-39) or HLSV (59- AGCC-
CAGGATAAACCTGAAG-39) primer; for mixed infection, both
primers were added (1 pmol each). Actin gene was used as an
Table 3. A summary of the extracted results of the 9 papers.
Virus 1 Virus 2 Host
Predicted
Dominance
Reported
Dominance
Existence
of ESS References
Maize chlorotic mottle
machlovirus (MCMV)
Wheat streak mosaic
rymovirus (WSMV)
N84Ht corn MCMV MCMV No Scheets (1998)
Zucchini yellow mosaic virus
(ZYMV)
Cucumber mosaic virus (CMV) Zucchini
(cv. Escandarani)
CMV CMV Yes Fattouh (2003)
Sweet potato chlorotic
stunt virus (SPCSV)
Sweet potato feathery
mottle virus common strain
(SPFMV-C)
Sweet potato SPCSV SPCSV No Kokkinos and Clark (2006)
Sweet potato chlorotic
stunt virus (SPCSV)
Sweet potato virus G (SPVG) Sweet potato SPCSV SPCSV No ibid.
Cucumber mosaic virus
(CMV)
Pepper mottle virus
(PepMoV)
Capsicum annuum
(cv. Early Calwonder)
PepMoV PepMoV Yes Murphy and Bowen (2006)
Zucchini yellow mosaic
virus (ZYMV-SD)
Cucumber mosaic virus
(CMV-Fny)
Cucumber ZYMV-SD CMV-Fny No Zeng et al (2007)
Zucchini yellow mosaic
virus (ZYMV-SD)
Cucumber mosaic virus
(CMV-Fny)
Bottle gourd CMV-Fny CMV-Fny Yes ibid.
Tomato chlorosis virus
(ToCV)
Tomato infectious chlorosis
virus (TICV)
Nicotiana benthamiana ToCV TiCV Yes Wintermantel et al (2008)
Tomato chlorosis virus
(ToCV)
Tomato infectious chlorosis
virus (TICV)
Physalis wrightii ToCV ToCV Yes ibid.
Turnip mosaic virus (TuMV) Cauliflower mosaic
caulimovirus (CaMV)
Arabidopsis thaliana TuMV TuMV No Martı ´n and Elena (2009)
Tomato rugose mosaic virus
(ToRMV)
Tomato yellow spot virus (ToYSV) Nicotiana benthamiana ToYSV ToYSV No Alves-Ju ´nior et al (2009)
Tomato rugose mosaic virus
(ToRMV)
Tomato yellow spot virus (ToYSV) Tomato ToYSV ToYSV No ibid.
Triticum mosaic virus (TriMV) Wheat streak mosaic virus (WSMV) Wheat
(cv. Tomahawk)
WSMV TriMV Yes Tatineni et al (2010)
Triticum mosaic virus (TriMV) Wheat streak mosaic virus (WSMV) Wheat
(cv. Arapahoe)
WSMV TriMV No ibid.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037007.t003
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primer.
qPCR Assays
All the cDNA samples were subjected to 50 6 dilutions for
qPCR analysis using BioRad CFX384 Real Time System. Each
cDNA was amplified in triplicates each containing 0.5 ml cDNA,
2.5 ml26SYBR Green PCR Master Mix (KAPA), 20 nM of the
primers qTMV-F (59-TAGAGTAGACGACGCAACGG-39) and
qTMV-R (59-AGAGGTCCAAACCAAACCAG-39) or qHLSV-F
(59-GAGACTTTGAATGCAACGCA-39) and qHLSV-R (59-
AGCCCAGGATAAACCTGAAG-39). All four primers were
included for cDNA obtained from mixed infection samples. The
actin gene in each sample, which was used as the reference gene,
was amplified in triplicates using primers qActin-F (59-
CTTGAAACAGCAAAGACCAGC-39) and qActin-R (59-
GGAATCTCTCAGCACCAATGG-39). Relative viral RNA ac-
cumulation was determined using 2
2DDCt method [28]. Primer
efficiency was comparable and repeats were within 2% of each
other.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Straffin chart for the interactions between Maize
chlorotic mottle machlovirus (MCMV) and Wheat streak mosaic
rymovirus (WSMV) in N84Ht corn (Scheets, 1998).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Straffin chart for the interactions between Zucchini
yellow mosaic virus (ZYMV) and Cucumber mosaic virus (CMV)
in zucchini cv. Escandarani (Fattouh, 2003).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Straffin chart for the interactions between Sweet
potato chlorotic stunt virus (SPCSV) and Sweet potato feathery
mottle virus common strain (SPFMV-C) in sweet potato (Kokkinos
& Clark, 2006).
(TIF)
Figure S4 Straffin chart for the interactions between Sweet
potato chlorotic stunt virus (SPCSV) and Sweet potato virus G
(SPVG) in sweet potato (Kokkinos & Clark, 2006).
(TIF)
Figure S5 Straffin chart for the interactions between Cucumber
mosaic virus (CMV) and Pepper mottle virus (PepMoV) in
Capsicum annuum cv. Early Calwonder (Murphy & Bowen, 2006).
(TIF)
Figure S6 Straffin chart for the interactions between Zucchini
yellow mosaic virus (ZYMV-SD) and Cucumber mosaic virus
(CMV-Fny) in cucumber (Zeng et al., 2007).
(TIF)
Figure S7 Straffin chart for the interactions between Zucchini
yellow mosaic virus (ZYMV-SD) and Cucumber mosaic virus
(CMV-Fny) in bottle gourd (Zeng et al., 2007).
(TIF)
Figure S8 Straffin chart for the interactions between Tomato
chlorosis virus (ToCV) and Tomato infectious chlorosis virus
(TICV) in Nicotiana benthamiana (Wintermantel et al., 2008).
(TIF)
Figure S9 Straffin chart for the interactions between Tomato
chlorosis virus (ToCV) and Tomato infectious chlorosis virus
(TICV) in Physalis wrightii (Wintermantel et al., 2008).
(TIF)
Figure S10 Straffin chart for the interactions between Turnip
mosaic virus (TuMV) and Cauliflower mosaic caulimovirus
(CaMV) in Arabidopsis thaliana (Martı ´n & Elena, 2009).
(TIF)
Figure S11 Straffin chart for the interactions between Tomato
rugose mosaic virus (ToRMV) and Tomato yellow spot virus
(ToYSV) in Nicotiana benthamiana (Alves-Junior et al., 2009).
(TIF)
Figure S12 Straffin chart for the interactions between Tomato
rugose mosaic virus (ToRMV) and Tomato yellow spot virus
(ToYSV) in tomato (Alves-Junior et al., 2009).
(TIF)
Figure S13 Straffin chart for the interactions between Triticum
mosaic virus (TriMV) and Wheat streak mosaic virus (WSMV) in
wheat cv. Tomahawk (Tatineni et al., 2010).
(TIF)
Figure S14 Straffin chart for the interactions between Triticum
mosaic virus (TriMV) and Wheat streak mosaic virus (WSMV) in
wheat cv. Arapahoe (Tatineni et al., 2010).
(TIF)
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